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Abstract—Our work presents the primary account for explor-
ing the forensics of immersive Virtual Reality (VR) systems and
their social applications. The Social VR applications studied
in this work include Bigscreen, Altspace VR, Rec Room and
Facebook Spaces. We explored the two most widely adopted
consumer VR systems: the HTC Vive and the Oculus Rift.
Our tests examined the efficacy of reconstructing evidence from
network traffic as well as the systems themselves. The results
showed that a significant amount of forensically relevant data
such as user names, user profile pictures, events, and system
details may be recovered. We anticipate that this work will
stimulate future research directions in VR and Augmented
Reality (AR) forensics as it is an area that is understudied and
needs more attention from the community.
Index Terms—Digital Forensics, Artifacts, Security, VR Ap-
plications, Virtual Reality, Steam, HTC Vive, Oculus Rift, VR
Social Applications, Immersive VR.
I. INTRODUCTION
V IRTUAL Reality (VR) is an emerging technology withpromise to deliver new perspectives to a variety of
applications. Most commonly, immersive VR facilitates a new
generation of Human Computer Interaction (HCI). Advances
in tracking technology have elevated user presence to a degree
that blurs boundaries between virtual and physical realities
[1]. Taking advantage of this, VR has found application in
physiological and military practices. The adaptability of a
Virtual Environment (VE) provides necessary conditions to
treat phobias, or simulate a realistic training exercise [2]. In
recent years, improvements in fabrication and reduced pro-
duction costs have introduced VR devices into the consumer
marketplace. Although new to the consumer market, VR has
a significant history since its inception in 1969 [3]. Despite
this, VR continues to occupy additional niches. One of which
is a modern breed of social interaction.
Should VR systems follow the same meteoric rise as mobile
device / social media usage, VR and Augmented Reality (AR)
would become commonplace in day-to-day activities. The use
of social applications has grown from 0.92 billion users in
2010 to 2.46 billion in 2017, a growth trend that is expected
to continue [4]. Furthermore, the average individual spends
116 minutes daily on social applications [5]. Just as mobile
phones have become another platform for social media, VR
stands to be the next generation medium for communication.
The latest craze of content sharing suits VR as users can
coinhabit VEs and contribute content unique to immersion.
When placed in an immersive VR environment, the user’s
view is completely obstructed from the real world due to the
Head Mounted Display (HMD). This means the user cannot
see anything around them except the VR environment. This
visual obstruction provides an adversary with the opportunity
to cause physical harm to an immersed VR user.
A recent study found that depth perception and balance were
temporarily deteriorated in children immediately following
20 minutes of VR immersion [6]. Furthermore, VR may
affect the psychological wellbeing of users given that they
feel completely immersed into an environment. Immersion
amplifies the consequences of cyber bullying and sexual
harassment, where the misconduct “feels all too real” [7]. A
legal precedence is yet to be set, however, VR wrongdoing
remains in the middle ground between virtual and legitimate
physical crimes [8].
In anticipation of a migration to virtual socialization, we
intend to arm cyber forensic researchers and practitioners with
the necessary tools and information to expedite investigations.
Our work is novel and makes the following contributions to
the digital forensics community:
• This is the first account for immersive VR forensics.
• We present the first account for forensically relevant
client-side and network-based artifacts generated by the
HTC Vive and the Oculus Rift.
• We present the first account for forensically relevant
network-based artifacts generated by the most widely
used immersive VR social applications.
• We stimulate future research, and publicly share primary
VR network datasets and system artifacts from our exper-
iments here: https://www.unhcfreg.com/datasetsandtools.
Our work is limited to logically acquired artifacts residing
on long term storage for room-scale immersive VR systems.
We do not examine small scale VR devices, such as the
Samsung Gear VR or the Pixel 2, nor investigate data in
volatile memory. Being that this is the first account of artifact
analysis of VR systems, our work aims to set direction for
continued research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
discuss VR applications and related work in Section II. The
methodology and apparatus used are discussed in Section III.
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We present our findings for system artifacts in Section IV,
followed by network analysis in Section V. We discuss our
findings in Section VI and identify areas for future work in
Section VII. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section
VIII.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND RELATED WORK
Artifacts acquired from VR social applications may serve as
digital evidence in future cases, similar to current messaging
applications used on mobile devices and computer systems.
High profile cases such as Brown and Nelthrope vs Kil-
patrick have involved analysis of Short Message Service
(SMS) resulting in pergery, evidence obtained long after the
crime [9]. Cellular providers that retain SMS and subscriber
information ease obtaining SMS activity, however, investiga-
tors may have limited time to retrieve these conversations [10].
Alternative messaging and social applications have become
increasingly popular. For instance, Google Voice employs
proprietary protocols in lieu of SMS, lowering costs associated
with cellular providers. With the added features, security
and low cost of third-party applications we can expect their
continued growth.
Instant Messaging (IM) applications initially held popularity
for adolescent socializing [11] and was later embraced in the
workplace, increasing productivity and shortening interrup-
tions [12]. An online presence introduced privacy concerns
unique to IM applications, such as broadcasting the users
status [13]. As shown by [14], examination of stand alone
messaging applications held forensic importance even prior to
mobile use. Techniques for examining PC based application
artifacts are described for AOL instant messenger (AIM)
[15], MSN Messenger 7.5 [16], and Yahoo Messenger 7.0 .
Transition to web-based messaging relieved the necessity for
registry keys and configuration files. Techniques for examining
page files and swap space for various web messengers are
described by [18] and Facebook Chat by [19].
Mobile phones have amplified user connectivity and have
been extensively examined, however, frequent updates to Op-
erating Systems (OS) and applications increase the difficulty
of maintaining a database of artifacts [20], [21]. Android social
applications were found to store identifying information and
often archive messages, raising concerns about privacy, [22],
[23]. Using Celebrite Universal Forensic Extraction Device
(UFED), [24] were able to obtain call logs and messages
from Android instant messaging applications WhatsApp and
Viber. Furthermore, [25] examined third-party applications for
the Apple iPhone and located information ranging from user-
names to geo-location data.
Third party messaging applications have also grown in
popularity, with WhatsApp reporting over 1 billion users
in 2016 [26]. Poor authentication procedures in messaging
alternatives are vulnerable to attack. Analysis of nine third
party applications, including WhatsApp, revealed potential
for account hijacking, spoofing, and unsolicited SMS’s [27].
Moreover, traces of conversations, and even photographs, from
social messaging applications were found to publicly remain
unencrypted on servers [28]. Other work has also explored the
decryption of voice traffic from applications such as WhatsApp
[29].
The bargain and convenience of third party messaging ap-
plications are at the cost of security. Following in stride, cloud
services pose a similar problem for secure communication
[30].
As VR systems become increasingly available to the con-
sumer, and content refined to complement existing means of
communication, we expect an influx of virtual socialization.
Such as each generation of messaging conceded flaws in
infancy, VR is no exception, producing a wealth of artifacts.
We have identified no prior work regarding the analysis of
trace evidence remaining from VR social applications, nor VR
systems in general.
A. Steam and SteamVR
The primary application distribution platform utilized in this
study was Steam by the Valve Corporation. Steam provides
services such as application acquisition and purchase, instal-
lation, multilayer matchmaking, support, automatic updating
and socialization [31]. Users maintain an account which allows
Steam to manage the user’s applications, friends, and pref-
erences. The features that Steam provide generally produce
artifacts, many of which are redundantly stored on Steam
Cloud Services.
Valve additionally provides support for VR systems and
applications. The HTC Vive was co-developed with Valve
and powered by SteamVR [32]. SteamVR is the hardware
interface that initializes and drives the VR hardware. Although
specifically designed for the HTC Vive, any VR system can
utilize SteamVR, with added drivers, due to the OpenVR
framework [33]. The nature of VR dictates that a great amount
of information regarding the state of the system and the
physical room be stored. This is used to calculate the location
of tracked objects and provide player safety to obstacles
in the room. The tracking devices, room configuration, and
VR preferences are also stored in a collection of artifacts.
This information is also stored via Steam Cloud Services,
therefore, network traffic analysis may furnish forensically
valuable artifacts.
In the following sections, we present the different social VR
applications that were forensically explored in our work. We
included these sections to inform readers not familiar with VR
social applications and their features.
B. BigScreen
Bigscreen supports both the HTC Vive and Oculus Rift. It is
a social VR application that allows VR immersed users to use
their computers in the VE [34]. The application allows users
not only to share their screens, but also to play Xbox One and
PlayStation 4 games, YouTube videos, television, Netflix, and
chat. Users are allowed to choose their own environment from
a simple campfire to outer VEs.
Users can also sketch, doodle, and white board and cus-
tomize the screen. The application allows multiple players in
public and private rooms. The maximum number of players
allowed in a public or private room is four, but the monitor
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support is limited to three monitors (either physical monitors
or virtual/emulated monitors). Like any other social appli-
cation, the users can voice and video chat and share their
computer screens with each other. One may think of BigScreen
as a virtual Local Area Network (LAN) party.
C. Rec Room
[35] compares Rec Room to the likes of youth and recre-
ation centers. The application allows users to engage in activ-
ities with other players, with more complex games in separate
rooms. Players and their movements are represented through
an avatar. Interactions between avatars have functionality,
where groups can be formed through a handshake. At the
time of writing, Rec Room offered six game rooms, such as
Charades, Paintball, Soccer, etc.
Similar to other social VR applications, Rec Room allows
players to customize their avatar and voice chat with other
users. Additionally, this application allows users to condi-
tionally filter interactions, muting or blocking other users. To
further moderate socialization, private rooms prevent unwanted
users from interfering or meddling with ongoing games. This
feature is especially helpful for parental control.
D. AltspaceVR
AltspaceVR is one of the most popular social platforms
for VR. Similar to the abovementioned applications, users can
interact with others around the world, and play interactive
games with friends day or night. This application lets users
attend live events such as stand up comedies and music events.
According to [36], NBC news announced a new science
series in VR. A couple took the next step and recited their
vows on May 25, 2017 using Altspace VR. This application
also allows user to voice chat and send messages to other
users.
E. Facebook Spaces
[37], head of Facebook’s social VR department, defined the
Facebook Spaces application as an extension of who users
are. Facebook Spaces not only allows users to chat and play
games, but also allows customizing one’s avatar based on
their profile picture. Through Facebook Messenger, Facebook
Spaces allows users to video or voice chat with friends and
family who do not have a VR headset.
At the time of writing, Facebook Spaces was only available
on the Oculus Rift and Oculus Touch.
III. METHODOLOGY
Applications were selected for testing by searching the
Steam and Oculus stores for the keywords ‘social’, ‘casual’,
and ‘online co-op’. Candidate applications were then exam-
ined to confirm socialization as the primary purpose of the
game. Although Steam does not disclose purchase statistics,
we assumed that the user population would correlate to the
quantity of user reviews. Applications that did not consistently
have users present were not considered for evaluation. Selected
applications and necessary drivers for the VR systems are
presented in Table I.
An analysis of logical system artifacts and network traffic
as a result of user activity was conducted. All testing was
conducted in a controlled lab environment. Moreover, a sterile
workstation was maintained to minimize irrelevant trace files
and extraneous network traffic.
A. Apparatus
To facilitate multiplayer interactions in a controlled environ-
ment, two identical workstations were employed. The details
of the computers are shown in Table 2. Additionally, this al-
lowed for a known comparison of interaction between different
VR systems (Figure 1). Testing was conducted utilizing both
the HTC Vive and the Oculus Rift, the details of which are
presented in Table 3.
B. Experimental Setup
Workstations were prepared by employing a factory reset
and installing Steam and Oculus. An initial examination of
the system was conducted to establish a baseline. The social
application was then installed and a subsequent sweep of the
system was conducted. User accounts solely for the purpose
of testing were created for Steam and Oculus, in addition to
new accounts for applications when required. A trial run was
then conducted and Wireshark (version 2.4.1) was activated to
capture network traffic.
Fig. 1. Experimental Setup for Network Traffic Collection
C. User Activity Scenarios
Once the system was adequately prepared and network
traffic collection was ongoing, the researchers commenced a










Facebook Spaces Beta 28.0.2507799
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extent, thus trials were tailored to accommodate each. The
activities conducted were analogous to that of a typical user
experience. Performed events common to most applications
were: joining and creating rooms, chatting, sharing content,
and interacting with other users.
A detailed account of all activities performed was main-
tained and logged throughout the trials. For each, the event,
application, time, user identity, and the identity of all other
involved parties were recorded.
D. Analysis
Forensic examination of the collected data was conducted
to determine if the activities performed on the VR social
applications were stored on the system. The application files
were compared to our baseline to identify traces resulting
from the trial. Furthermore, a manual examination of all
Steam, Oculus and social application logs was conducted for
completeness. Evidence was typically found in a log intended
for debugging. Network traffic was filtered to isolate only
streams relevant to the social applications, Steam or Oculus.
Manual examination of packet payloads was conducted to
identify readily available information.
Details regarding the state of the system or user activity,
uncovered from either artifacts remaining in long term storage
or captured in network traffic, was recored.
IV. SUMMARY OF SYSTEM ARTIFACT FINDINGS
A. Steam Artifacts
Multiple files related to the Steam application were found.
Two folders were created: one in the program files (C:\
Program Files (86x)\ Steam) and another in the user’s profile
(C:\ Users\ Username\ AppData\ Local\ Steam). The first
folder contained the appcache, backups, config files, controller
data, logs, music, drivers, server details and userdata. The
second folder contained the html cache details and Widevine
modules. Widevine is the digital management system used by
Steam to manage digital content.
The httpcache folder contained thousands of folders with
details such as sites visited, HTTP responses and timestamps.
The stats folder contained gaming statistics, such as achieve-
ments unlocked. The appinfo file contained the application id,
application name, License type, application version and last
updated information (Table IV, 1). The config folder contained
the avatar preferences for each Steam profile and lighthouse
data (Table IV, 2-4). Within the config directory, the lighthouse
file contained the base station details, such as the last time
Chaperone information was updated (Chaperone resembles
the virtual boundaries of a user in a VE). Additional entries
found in the lighthouse file contained the manufacturer details,
master serial number, model number and tracking details, such
as coordinates. The vrappconfig files indicate the launch time
of different applications. The chaperone info file contains the
details of collision bounds, play area bounds and timestamp
details (Table IV, 4).
Two authorization files were found hidden in the folder C:\
Program Files (86x)\ Steam and both could be used to bypass
two-factor authentication. The loginusers file provided the
account name, person name and timestamp of the most recent
login (Table IV, 5). The directory C:\ Program Files (86x)\
logs holds the logs of the VR client and VR server, as well
as application logs (Table IV, 1-11). The connection log.txt
file contained information regarding Steam connections, such
as port details and number of connections established. The
content log.txt contained the logs of installed applications and
included details such as IP addresses, Steam sites and times-
tamps (Table IV, 6). The remote connections file contained
timestamps and details of the system the Steam user utilized
to log in(Table IV, 8).
The logs folder also contained the logs related to applica-
tions such as AltspaceVR, Bigscreen Beta, and Rec Room.
These files contained splash screens with timestamps, which
are used to load the settings of the applications. The file
vrserver.txt contained the connections to lighthouse and also
contained the logs of adding the base stations (Table IV, 17).
The file user vr vive.vcfg contained the username associated
with the Steam account, while the localconfig.vdf file con-
tained the actual or given name of the Steam user.
Another Steam folder was created in the Documents folder
of the system. This contained a number of SQLite and JPEG
files related to the Steam applications. The SQL database files
contained cookie-related details, such as cookie name, cookie
expiry date and cookie value. Other located data files included
details such as server sites, IP addresses, HTTP response
codes, and date and timestsamps. Image files were located and
examined, revealing that these files were cached from html
pages previously accessed by Steam.
TABLE 3
VIRTUAL REALITY DEVICES
HTC Vive Oculus Rift
Device VID PID Firmware Device VID PID Firmware
Hub N/A N/A N/A Rift 2833 0031 708/b1ae4f61ae
Hub Controller 0424 274D N/A Rift Audio 2833 0330 708/b1ae4f61ae
Bluetooth N/A N/A 211 Sensor x3 2833 0211 178/e9c7e04064ed1bd7a089
Watchman Board 28DE 2000 1462663157 Left Touch f3c65f7a5f
Camera 0BB4 2C87 8590262295 Right Touch f3c65f7a5f
Audio Device 0D8C 0012 3
Main Board 0BB4 2C87 1.6
Wireless Receiver 1 28DE 2101 C638F6E4EF






Processor Intel Core i7-6700 CPU
System Type: 64-bit OS, x64 processor
Graphics Card NVDIA GeForce GTx 1070
Manufacturer iBUYPOWER
Installed Memory (RAM) 8.00 GB
B. Bigscreen Beta System Artifacts
Bigscreen Beta was available for both the HTC Vive and
the Oculus Rift, thus sterile accounts were created for testing
both systems. Common activities such as creating rooms,
joining existing rooms and chatting were performed on both.
Data collection and analysis was then conducted for artifacts
corresponding to both VR systems.
Artifact files were found stored in multiple locations on
the system. The Steam-generated Bigscreen activity logs (vr-
client Bigscreen.txt) were stored in the previously discussed
Steam\logs directory. The text file contained configuration
settings for Bigscreen and responses from the vrserver. The
file also contained the timestamps of application start time
and end time, the System OS and version. No indicators of
user activity were found in the file vrclient Bigscreen.txt
Fig. 2. Big Screen Application Log
Application and user events were primarily logged in the
directory SteamLibrary\ steamapps\ common\ Bigscreen\
Bigscreen Data. Two log files, output log.txt and out-
put log2.txt, were consistently produced in this folder. The
output log2.txt file contained the Interactive Connectivity Es-
tablishment (ICE) server responses and system display set-
tings. The entry for HMD in output log.txt indicated the type
of VR headset (HTC Vive/Oculus Rift) the user had used. The
output log.txt file provided details of playback devices and
audio output. The output log.txt also contained the timestamps
of scene initialization. As shown in Figure 2, the logs show
user details and ID’s, respectively. Given the Steam ID, profile
details such as name, creation date, last login date, and location
can be ascertained from a web database [38]. The log con-
tained details of the virtual room, administrator, screen sharing
information, environment chosen, and the seating order. All
the social activities performed during testing are reflected in
the logs, thus giving the chance to interpret and reconstruct
the incident that occurred. Both log files were similarly
produced when testing was replicated for the Oculus Rift,
however, the corresponding directory was \ Oculus\ Software\
Software\ bigscreen-bigscreen\ Bigscreen\ Bigscreen Data.
The Bigscreen Beta development team produces these logs
for the purpose of debugging user issues [39].
During testing, detailed accounts of activities were main-
tained to correlate the timestamps to relevant artifacts. Using
the details of our activities as a baseline, the sequence of
events is easily distinguishable within the logs. The scenario
was constructed utilizing both the HTC Vive and the Oculus
Rift, where the users created a room, joined a room, chatted,
and shared videos. A general timeline of events is shown in
Table V, with the corresponding log entry indicating the event.
The remainder of this discussion will refer to Table V.
Fig. 3. Artifact Containing System Information
Initialization of the application (Event 1), also signified
by the creation of the log, was indicated by the date and
time, followed by the Unity Version. This was of relevance
given that all following timestamps are relative to this entry.
The initialization procedure includes a survey of the system
hardware and transfer of microphone and audio playback to
the HMD. These log entries inform the investigator of the
devices and software used. Figure 3 provides an example of
hardware information discovered following a simulation with
the HTC Vive.
Immediately following application initialization, the user
was placed into a single player room (Event 2). Although
explicitly stated in the log, the room can also be assumed
to be single player from the lack of a room ID. In fact, the
following event utilizes a room ID from when the user created
a public, multiplayer room (Event 3). This attribute seems
like a randomly generated tag for referencing the room and is
independent of the room display name (not present in the logs).
Public rooms populate in the application with a display name,
however, private rooms may only be referenced via the room
ID. No further authentication is required, thus this practice
may be vulnerable to a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack.
Event 4 shows the entry of the player labvr53 into the room.
Bigscreen does not route shared video and audio through their




File Name Location* Content
1 appinfo.vdf \Steam\appcache App id, infostate, lastupated time, accesstoken (can be modified to rename the
games as per the user locally to steam)
2 lighthousedb.json \Steam\config Manufacturer details, master serial number, model number, tracking coordinates
3. vrappconfig files \Steam\config\vrappconfig Application launch times
4 chaperone info.vrchap \Steam\config Collision and play area bounds
5 loginusers.vdf \Steam\config Steam ID, account name, user name, account creation date
6 content log.txt \Steam\logs Contains information on every application downloaded, updated, or run through
Steam.
7 connection log.txt \Steam\logs Contains number of connections with Steam and port details.
8 remote connections.txt \Steam\logs Logged communication between clients and port numbers.
9 broadcast log.txt \Steam\logs Screenshot and video upload information for Steam broadcasting with times-
tamps.
10 cloud log.txt \Steam\logs Log of information uploaded to the Steam Cloud, includes application names.
11 parental log.txt \Steam\logs Parental control information.
12 runprocess log.txt \Steam\logs List of applications run with ID’s and start times.
13 streaming log.txt \Steam\logs Streaming times and device information for Steam broadcasting
14 vrclient vrcompositor.txt \Steam\logs Collision bounds, play area size
15 vrcompositor.txt \Steam\logs Collision bounds, display information
16 vrmonitor.txt \Steam\logs Device info, audio, video, bluetooth, startup, shutdown.
17 vrserver.txt \Steam\logs Vive info and its accessories activities, including startup display, communication
*Parent directory: C:\Program Files
ICE 1. FMOD, a commonly used audio utility for applications
created in Unity and Unreal, facilitated the transfer of micro-
phone audio, the details of which are additionally included
in the log [40]. Additionally, corresponding log entries are
generated when audio and video streams are disposed of upon
a user exiting the room (Event 5).
In addition to what is presented in Table V, Events 6 and
7, the joining of an ongoing party, are easily distinguishable
given the large amount of simultaneous ICE offers and re-
1Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) is a technique used in ap-
plications using video and voice to avoid communication through a central
server as the central server introduces delay.
sponses. Aside from the absence of an entry for room creation,
we can ascertain the room was created by another user from
the user state transactions. We can see from the Event 6 log,
the user Christy is the administrator and the only user to
specify the environment. Events 8 and 9 are indicated by the
closure of all remaining data streams and are explicitly stated
in the logs.
Although the contents of the data streams were not available
in non-volatile memory, a reconstruction of major events is
plausible through artifact analysis. Data relevant to the system
state, as well as user information and activity, was found
readily available and conveniently consolidated in log form.
TABLE V






2 Default Room Load (00:01.86): (00:08:214) Initializing scene
(00:01.88): (00:08:234) Is in singleplayer room
3 Create Room
(00:51.12): (00:57:47) Reload scene, with user:
user1 in room room-yhjdbg9b, enviro should be Living Room Day
(00:51.48): (00:57:837) Is in multiplayer room
(00:51.48): (00:57:838) Created room - Loading My User defaults
4 New playerenters room
(01:01.37): ------------- NEW CONNECTION
(01:01.37): (01:07:72) InitiatePeerConnection ... to user: user2
(01:02.01): (01:08:36) NewUserJoinedRoom user2
(01:05.58): Received user state =userid=user2 userName=labvr53
(01:06.01): Sending user state to new player =userid=user1 userName=labvr54
5 user2 Leaves Room (05:43.92): [UILog] user2 has left the room
(05:43.93): (05:50:28) UI.DestroyPeerConnection
6 Joining multipleplayer room
(03:39.25): ------------- NEW CONNECTION
(03:39.25): (03:42:43) InitiatePeerConnection ... to user: user2
(03:39.25): (03:42:434) Is in multiplayer room
7 Admin details
(03:41.70): Received user state =userid=user3 userName=Christy
steamId=76561198449315150 oculusId= area=0 seat=2 isAdmin=True
environment=North Balcony remoteUserSeatOrder=,user3,user2
8 Player Leaves Room (06:56.78): (07:03:13) UI.StopAllStreaming
(06:57.78): (07:04:13) Reload scene, with user: user1 in room none
9 Close Application (07:02.56): Exiter@OnApplicationQuit Successful
7
TABLE VI




UnloadTime: 1.798012 ms Connected to lighthouse:LHR-676305F7
Platform: STEAM, Hardware: VIVE
Platform Profile Name: labvr53
Platform Tracking Mode: THREE_SIXTY_DEGREE
2 Failed Login attempts RecNet login failed: Email is already in use
3 Login Profile ID: 203970,Profile DisplayName: SteamingCrow
Junior Profile: False SID: 1513369227130
4 Joining Dorm Room Player joined activity "Dorm Room" with playerCount 1
5 Joining Rec Center Player joined activity "Rec Center" with playerCount 7
6 Exit application Releasing render texture that is set as Camera.targetTexture!
OpenVR Shutdown
TABLE VII




[2.917] Main: Loading version data...
[2.921] Main: Authenticating unity...
Device ID: 6d3d9d59-ccde-426d-9f8d-6f6ffd12493d
Coherent Browser system initialized..|
2 Enter as Guest Logged in as 780656450304212995 Guest52143385
3 Enter with username Logged in as 823353831441039440 labvr53
4 Joining a room
[165.164] Connecting to Photon room 613940881048732244_16ed3ab11
Connect to: 54.214.112.182:5055




[210.458] Started Travel to space disc-golf-lobby
[250.936] Loading asset bundle https://dc1gsc5wc5y2l.cloudfront.net/environments/Disc/
df/22/Disc-df220b7f.unity5... 100%
6 Engaging in an activity
[319.936] Loading asset bundle
https://dc1gsc5wc5y2l.cloudfront.net/environments/JungleMaze/
00/b2/JungleMaze-00b24fbc.unity5... 100%
7 Leaving a room
[588.453] Started Travel to space experience-space-831179190551183822
Focus Changed from[SharedBrowser (WebBrowser)] to[]
Left Room
8 Closing application Quitting Unity
C. Rec Room Artifacts
Examination and analysis of both Steam and Oculus di-
rectories, as well as application specific folders, yielded a
log similar to that of Bigscreen. For both systems, the file
contained the profile name and platform and hardware infor-
mation. Profile information specific to Rec Room was also
found in output log.txt. Events typical to the game were
initiated, namely, entering the Rec Room, joining activities,
chatting, and taking pictures and videos.
From this log, we were able to identify particular events and
collect system information, as presented in Table VI. Upon
application initialization, the user Steam ID is logged as well
as a survey of hardware (Event 1). Rec Room requires an
application specific profile and login, the details of which were
found in the entries for Events 2 and 3. Note that Rec Room
distinguishes between junior and adult users, the former of
which is restricted from chatting and attending certain events
[41]. Any transition between rooms or activities is likewise
recorded in the logs (Events 4 and 5). Within rooms or
activities, the user often records photos or videos; this media
was found to be stored in the directory C:\ users\ username\
Documents\ Rec Room. Finally, the user can be observed to
exit the application, as indicated by a release of resources and
shutdown (Event 6).
The user activity and system information associated with
this application were also conveniently located and consol-
idated, however, timestamps related to the log entries were
not available. Given the sequence of events is preserved,
an approximate time may be applied from related artifact
modification timestamps.
D. AltspaceVR Artifacts
Examination of directories related to AltspaceVR, Steam
and Oculus revealed a number of files containing relevant
digital evidence. The most notable artifact, output log.txt, was
found in the default Steam application folder. In general, this
output file contained the profile name, VE, and timestamped
user activities, as shown in Table VII. The application was
tested using both a user and guest account; the login identity
of the user can be found in the entries shown for Events 2
and 3. The output file also provided the details of the games
played by the user, such as a maze and disc game, as seen in
Events 5 and 6. The user can be observed leaving the current
activity in Event 7 and closing the application in Event 8.




File Name Location** Contents
1 output log.txt \facebook-vr-facebookvr\FacebookSpaces Data User name, activity log
2 fbrti *.txt \facebook-vr-facebookvr\fbrti logs Audio and video details
3 FBCaptureSDK.txt \facebook-vr-facebookvr Log of video codec and audio device details
4 * \facebook-vr-facebookvr User friends’ profile pictures
5 avatar2 \facebook-vr-facebookvr\FacebookSpaces Data
\StreamingAssets\Avatar2\Win64
User profile picture
* File name generated from timestamp **Parent Directory: D:\Oculus Apps\Software
with timestamps, activities such as sending a friend request
and chatting within the application were not found in this file.
The folder C:\ users\ username\ AppData \ LocalLow \
AltspaceVR \ Unity contained the unity logs of settings such
as the config and platform rules, along with timestamps. This
also contained the AltspaceVR Version and username.
E. Facebook Spaces Artifacts
Facebook, the parent company to Oculus, did not extend
Facebook Spaces to Steam, thus testing was solely for the
Rift. Files related to Facebook Spaces were found in the folder
D:\ Oculus Apps \ Software. The commonly observed log file
(Table VIII, 1) was found to contain the user name, room ID
and activity details.
The second file, fbrti *.txt, contained the logs of control
information for RTP2 sessions. The created file name indicated
the date of recent login. The file also contained the encrypted
username fragment and password of Session Traversal Utilities
for NAT (STUN) connectivity. STUN is a tool used by ICE
to discover the presence of a network address translator in
case of remote hosts. From the fbrti *.txt file we found
that the agent is a lite implementation in terms of Session
Description Protocol (SDP) connectivity. SDP is used for
multimedia session initiation. The file also included the Real
Time Control Protocol (RTCP) attributes. Further analysis
yielded forensically interesting results. In addition to all the
abovementioned details, it also contained the number of audio
calls made, if video was used in the call and the number
of peers interacted with. The RTP session information found
in the file fbrti *.txt can be used to intercept traffic and
2Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is used in applications involving
streaming media for the purpose of delivering audio and video over IP
networks. RTCP carries the control information of RTP protocol.
TABLE IX
BIGSCREEN ACTIVITY AND NETWORK ARTIFACTS
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potentially eavesdrop on user calls. This makes the application
potentially vulnerable to session hijacking and other attacks.
The third file located, FBCaptureSDK.txt, contained video
and audio codecs, bit rates, frame timestamps and audio device
names that were used. The profile pictures of the user’s friends
were saved in the default Oculus folder. All the files discussed
above were created and stored in two different places in the
system - one in the Oculus Apps default folder and one in the
documents folder of the system.
V. NETWORK ARTIFACT FINDINGS
Three of the four social applications tested employed a
secure protocol. Our initial work did not focus on breaking
security protocols. Low-hanging fruit packet inspection was
not possible for network traffic collected from these appli-
cations, however, much of Bigscreen’s communications were
unencrypted.
During testing, various activities were performed to generate
data in real time. The activity and corresponding details related
to Bigscreen events were located and the corresponding logs
listed in Table IX. Transport Control Protocol (TCP) streams
relevant to Bigscreen were identifiable given the contents of
the HTTP Get request. Streams that contained the strings
‘steamid’ and ‘person name’ were isolated using the filter
“tcp.stream eq x”. Details such as username, steam profile
ID, last log off time and timestamp of profile creation were
found in cleartext during the initialization of the application
(Event 1). As discussed in Section IV-A, from this infor-
mation we were able to retrieve profile photos and public
details. Bigscreen uses the WebSocket protocol for client-
server exchange. The WebSocket Protocol empowers two-path
correspondence between a user running untrusted code in a
controlled situation to a remote host that has selected in to
interchanges from that code. The convention comprises of
an opening handshake taken after by fundamental message
surrounding, layered over TCP [42]. This protocol was fil-
tered by using “tcp.stream eq 24” to intercept details of the
room. Event 2 indicates the room details that were exchanged
between the client and server and, in this case, the system and
Bigscreen server. The room details include room ID, room
name, number of participants per room, description and the
environment chosen.
Event 3 shows the user joining a public room named “test”.
Details, such as room administrator and room creation time,
are seen in cleartext. Besides a username, a unique user ID
is associated with every user for authentication. A random
identifier was associated with every user’s desktop. Multiple
offer requests were noticed with RTP streams, indicating a
shared video, as seen in Event 4. However, the content of data
streams were encrypted. A new update was exchanged every
time a new room was created or a new user was added. Event
5 shows a new user, guillaume37, joining the room. Closing
the application disconnects all the ICE connections and STUN
sessions.
All data related to the Bigscreen application can be used
to reconstruct events. As the data in the Bigscreen application
is not encrypted, the application is potentially vulnerable to
many attacks, such as MITM.
VI. DISCUSSION
For all applications tested, we were successful in recon-
structing the general course of events. Many of the events
are tagged with precise timestamps, allowing an investigator
to tie these events to auxiliary evidence. In all cases, the
user identity was observable, providing non-repudiation to the
system. Should investigators require proof of interaction with
particular individuals, this was observable in Bigscreen, Rec
Room and Facebook Spaces. Many of the in-game events
a user would typically perform per application, were also
inferable from the logs.
A consistency for name and location was found regarding
the logs intended for debugging. This is likely an artifact of
application development occurring in identical game engines
(Unity). The similar manner in which the logs are constructed
and stored is also advantageous to the forensic examiner.
Although the contents of the audio and video streams were
not accessible due to encryption, the information uncovered in
the network logs may allow an adversary to hijack or eaves-
drop on the user sessions. A MITM attack against Bigscreen is
certainly plausible given the lack of encryption, which could
leak identifying information. With this information, an attacker
will be able to inject themselves into a private room, as no
further authentication is required.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Our selection of social applications is a snapshot of the
current state of content available. The market share for virtual
socialization has yet to converge, thus we expect continued
competition and creation of social applications. As newcomers
enter the ecosystem and resident applications update, contin-
ued cataloging of artifacts pertinent to digital investigators
is warranted. For example, Bigscreen announced an update,
Big Room, allowing an unlimited number of users at a time
[43]. Features such as this may yield a large amount of
identifiable information, however, changes in protocol and
privacy improvements may nullify previous work.
Virtual socialization is not limited to the genre of ap-
plications our study encompassed. Both the HTC Vive and
Oculus Rift include a microphone as a standard feature and
many applications allow multiple players. The application is
the vessel in which the players congregate and mingle; a
possibility for a wide variety of applications, to include all
multiplayer cooperative games. We cannot assume the activity
of interest for a digital investigator will have occurred in a
social application, thus further analysis of VR applications,
regardless of genre is appropriate.
A recent update to Steam allowed user preferences, game
progress, and system data to be backed-up to the Steam
Cloud. Further analysis of the protocols and access privileges
for this information may reveal additional points of data
collection. The HMD, being a complex piece of hardware,
may also maintain information regarding the system state post-
use. Extracting the HMD state and location directly from the
hardware may be advantageous should the workstation driving
the VR system be unavailable due to evidence preservation.
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To aid future VR investigations, we intend to create tools to
rapidly extract and reconstruct events from artifacts discovered
in this study. As a comprehensive catalog may not be plausible,
a solution incorporating block hash matching, as described by
[44] may relieve man hours associated with manual cataloging.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At the time of writing, there were no studies that have
addressed the forensic analysis and recovery of activities
performed through social VR applications on the HTC vive
and Oculus Rift. Our work focused on the recovery of artifacts
and traces related to use of social VR applications on two
different platforms; HTC Vive and Oculus Rift. This study
aimed to determine if the activities that were performed
through these applications were stored and may be recovered
from user’s system/network. The tested social VR applications
were Facebook Spaces, AltspaceVR, Steam, Rec Room and
Bigscreen.
Our results showed that significant amount of data related
to Bigscreen, Steam and Facebook Spaces may be recovered.
No traces of Oculus application could be easily ascertained
from the system.
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